Don't blame losses on McClendon
Friday, May 20, 2005
By Bob Smizik, Pittsburgh Post-Gazette
Nothing rouses baseball fans more than managerial strategy that doesn't work. Lloyd McClendon was in the middle of two ninth-inning losses this week that had many fans and some media members questioning his competency.
Let's take a look at McClendon's moves in these games against the Chicago Cubs.
On Tuesday, with one out, a runner on third and the Pirates leading, 3-2, McClendon opted not to walk Derrek Lee, who then hit a winning home run.
Those advocating intentionally walking Lee and putting the winning run on base obviously had him confused with Barry Bonds, the only present-day player who might be walked in such circumstances. Lee is not Bonds, although he was portrayed by McClendon bashers as a slugger of legendary proportions.
Coming into the game, Lee was on a 1-for-13 run. After a sizzling April, he was batting .234 in May. That's hardly worthy of the kind of respect some were demanding he receive.
The fact he had three hits and a home run already in the game was not reason to walk him; it was reason not to walk him.
If all the games in baseball history in which a player hit a home run were stacked next to the games in which a player hit two home runs, the difference would be at least 25 to 1. Hitting two home runs in a game might not be rare, but it's unusual. Because he already had hit a home run and had two other hits, the percentages were high that Lee, a lifetime .270 hitter, would not hit a home run and would not get a hit.
But McClendon's decision went beyond the right-handed hitting Lee. It pertained to reliever Jose Mesa; to left-handed hitting Jeromy Burnitz, the next batter; and to PNC Park.
McClendon's greatest knowledge of Mesa's pitching pattern is derived from the 2004 season. During that season, Mesa had considerably more success against right-handed batters (Lee) than left-handed batters (Burnitz). Left-handers batted .331 against him; right-handers .255. Mesa allowed six home runs in 2004 -- two by right-handers, four by left-handers, although he faced more right-handed batters.
Mesa, clearly, was more effective against right-handers than left-handers.
This goes a long way toward negating the notion that Lee was a significantly more serious threat than Burnitz. In fact, Burnitz might have been the greater threat.
In the course of his career, Burnitz has hit a home run every 18 at-bats. In his career, Lee has homered every 21 at-bats. The past three seasons, Burnitz has homered every 16 at-bats, Lee every 17 at-bats.
Statistically, at least, Burnitz, who was 3 for 9 with a home run and a double off Mesa, was more of a threat than Lee.
Finally, there is the ballpark. It's a well-known fact that it's easier for a left-handed batter to hit a home run at PNC.
Beyond doubt, McClendon's decision to pitch to Lee was the right one.
Which brings us to the game Wednesday, when, with Mesa again pitching, McClendon reversed his strategy and put the winning run on base. He intentionally walked Corey Patterson with a runner on second and one out in the ninth with the Pirates leading, 2-1, to bring Jason Dubois to bat. McClendon had to know that Chicago would counter with left-handed hitting Todd Hollandsworth.
On the surface this sounds like the exact opposite strategy of the night before and therefore incredibly stupid.
It wasn't particularly brilliant and, in fact, was wrong. But it was nowhere near being the reverse of the day before.
On Tuesday, McClendon pitched to Lee because he didn't want to face the dangerous Burnitz. On Wednesday, he walked Patterson because he wanted to pitch to Hollandsworth, who was hitless in six lifetime at-bats against Mesa.
It was the wrong strategy, but there was logical thinking involved. It wasn't who he was walking -- Lee and Patterson -- but who the walk gave the Pirates a chance to face. Hollandsworth was a far better option than Burnitz.
McClendon also was criticized for relieving Kip Wells in favor of Mesa. That's nonsense. That's the way McClendon manages, that's the way almost every manager in baseball does it.
Going into that game, since the start of the 2004 season, the Pirates were 78-2 when leading after eight innings. They had achieved that excellent record because McClendon invariably used his closer in the ninth. If the strategy worked 98 percent of the time in the past, it would be the height of recklessness to veer from it.
Finally, Jack Wilson also took some criticism for swinging at the first pitch with the bases loaded and one out in the ninth. He grounded into a double play.
Working the pitcher is all the rage these days, and there's something to be said for that approach. But not in the ninth inning, not with Jack Wilson.
There are two statistics you need to know about this situation. Despite being in the midst of a terrible year, Wilson came into that final at-bat hitting .400 (6 for 15) when swinging at the first pitch. Last year, he batted .420 (29 for 69) when swinging at the first pitch.
If Wilson saw a pitch he liked, and he did, he would have been a fool to "work the pitcher." He did the right thing and ripped.
Managing didn't cost the Pirates these games. Lack of timely hitting and poor relief pitching were the reasons they lost.
Friday, May 20, 2005
By Bob Smizik, Pittsburgh Post-Gazette
Nothing rouses baseball fans more than managerial strategy that doesn't work. Lloyd McClendon was in the middle of two ninth-inning losses this week that had many fans and some media members questioning his competency.
Let's take a look at McClendon's moves in these games against the Chicago Cubs.
On Tuesday, with one out, a runner on third and the Pirates leading, 3-2, McClendon opted not to walk Derrek Lee, who then hit a winning home run.
Those advocating intentionally walking Lee and putting the winning run on base obviously had him confused with Barry Bonds, the only present-day player who might be walked in such circumstances. Lee is not Bonds, although he was portrayed by McClendon bashers as a slugger of legendary proportions.
Coming into the game, Lee was on a 1-for-13 run. After a sizzling April, he was batting .234 in May. That's hardly worthy of the kind of respect some were demanding he receive.
The fact he had three hits and a home run already in the game was not reason to walk him; it was reason not to walk him.
If all the games in baseball history in which a player hit a home run were stacked next to the games in which a player hit two home runs, the difference would be at least 25 to 1. Hitting two home runs in a game might not be rare, but it's unusual. Because he already had hit a home run and had two other hits, the percentages were high that Lee, a lifetime .270 hitter, would not hit a home run and would not get a hit.
But McClendon's decision went beyond the right-handed hitting Lee. It pertained to reliever Jose Mesa; to left-handed hitting Jeromy Burnitz, the next batter; and to PNC Park.
McClendon's greatest knowledge of Mesa's pitching pattern is derived from the 2004 season. During that season, Mesa had considerably more success against right-handed batters (Lee) than left-handed batters (Burnitz). Left-handers batted .331 against him; right-handers .255. Mesa allowed six home runs in 2004 -- two by right-handers, four by left-handers, although he faced more right-handed batters.
Mesa, clearly, was more effective against right-handers than left-handers.
This goes a long way toward negating the notion that Lee was a significantly more serious threat than Burnitz. In fact, Burnitz might have been the greater threat.
In the course of his career, Burnitz has hit a home run every 18 at-bats. In his career, Lee has homered every 21 at-bats. The past three seasons, Burnitz has homered every 16 at-bats, Lee every 17 at-bats.
Statistically, at least, Burnitz, who was 3 for 9 with a home run and a double off Mesa, was more of a threat than Lee.
Finally, there is the ballpark. It's a well-known fact that it's easier for a left-handed batter to hit a home run at PNC.
Beyond doubt, McClendon's decision to pitch to Lee was the right one.
Which brings us to the game Wednesday, when, with Mesa again pitching, McClendon reversed his strategy and put the winning run on base. He intentionally walked Corey Patterson with a runner on second and one out in the ninth with the Pirates leading, 2-1, to bring Jason Dubois to bat. McClendon had to know that Chicago would counter with left-handed hitting Todd Hollandsworth.
On the surface this sounds like the exact opposite strategy of the night before and therefore incredibly stupid.
It wasn't particularly brilliant and, in fact, was wrong. But it was nowhere near being the reverse of the day before.
On Tuesday, McClendon pitched to Lee because he didn't want to face the dangerous Burnitz. On Wednesday, he walked Patterson because he wanted to pitch to Hollandsworth, who was hitless in six lifetime at-bats against Mesa.
It was the wrong strategy, but there was logical thinking involved. It wasn't who he was walking -- Lee and Patterson -- but who the walk gave the Pirates a chance to face. Hollandsworth was a far better option than Burnitz.
McClendon also was criticized for relieving Kip Wells in favor of Mesa. That's nonsense. That's the way McClendon manages, that's the way almost every manager in baseball does it.
Going into that game, since the start of the 2004 season, the Pirates were 78-2 when leading after eight innings. They had achieved that excellent record because McClendon invariably used his closer in the ninth. If the strategy worked 98 percent of the time in the past, it would be the height of recklessness to veer from it.
Finally, Jack Wilson also took some criticism for swinging at the first pitch with the bases loaded and one out in the ninth. He grounded into a double play.
Working the pitcher is all the rage these days, and there's something to be said for that approach. But not in the ninth inning, not with Jack Wilson.
There are two statistics you need to know about this situation. Despite being in the midst of a terrible year, Wilson came into that final at-bat hitting .400 (6 for 15) when swinging at the first pitch. Last year, he batted .420 (29 for 69) when swinging at the first pitch.
If Wilson saw a pitch he liked, and he did, he would have been a fool to "work the pitcher." He did the right thing and ripped.
Managing didn't cost the Pirates these games. Lack of timely hitting and poor relief pitching were the reasons they lost.
