Dying For W

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Dying For W
By Robert Parry

George W. Bush admits he has no evidence that a withdrawal timetable from Iraq would be harmful. Instead, the President told interviewer Charlie Rose that this core assumption behind his veto threat of a Democratic war appropriation bill is backed by “just logic.”
“I mean, you say we start moving troops out,” Bush said in the interview on April 24. “Don’t you think an enemy is going to wait and adjust based upon an announced timetable for withdrawal?”
It is an argument that Bush has made again and again over the past few years, that with a withdrawal timetable, the “enemy” would just “wait us out.” But the answer to Bush’s rhetorical question could be, “well, so what if they do?”
If Bush is right and a withdrawal timetable quiets Iraq down for the next year or so – a kind of de facto cease-fire – that could buy time for the Iraqis to begin the difficult process of reconciliation and start removing the irritants that have enflamed the violence.
One of those irritants has been the impression held by many Iraqi nationalists that Bush and his neoconservative advisers want to turn Iraq into a permanent colony while using its territory as a land-based aircraft carrier to pressure or attack other Muslim nations.
The neocons haven’t helped by referring to Bush’s 2003 conquest as the “USS Iraq” and joking about whether next to force “regime change” in Syria or Iran, with the punch-line, “Real men go to Tehran.”
By refusing to set an end date for the U.S. military occupation, Bush has fed this suspicion, prompting many Iraqis – both Sunni and Shiite – to attack American troops. Another negative consequence has been that the drawn-out Iraq War has bought time for foreign al-Qaeda terrorists to put down roots with Sunni insurgents.
Obviously, there is no guarantee that a timetable for a U.S. withdrawal would bring peace to Iraq. The greater likelihood remains that civil strife will continue for some years to come as Iraq’s factions nurse their grievances and push for a new national equilibrium.
But the counterpoint to Bush’s veto threat against a withdrawal timetable is that his open-ended war is doomed to failure. To attain even the appearance of limited success would require American forces to effectively exterminate all Iraqis who are part of the armed resistance to the U.S. occupation.
After all, the only logical reason for not wanting the “enemy” to lie low is so American troops can capture or kill them.
That has been Bush’s strategy for the past four-plus years – longer than it took the United States to win World War II – and the military situation has only grown increasingly dire. Meanwhile, anti-Americanism has swelled around the world, especially among Muslims.
Failed Surge
But a long, bloody stalemate is the likely result from Bush’s stubbornness. With little fanfare, the Bush administration has essentially abandoned its earlier “exit strategy” of training a new Iraqi army so as “they stand up, we’ll stand down.”
Bush’s much-touted “surge” – beefing up American forces in Baghdad and other hot spots – is an indirect acknowledgement that the training was a flop. The “surge” is a do-over of the war’s original approach of relying on American troops to bring security to the country.
The “surge” also places American troops in lightly defended outposts in Iraqi neighborhoods, rather than concentrating U.S. forces in high-security barracks. The Pentagon acknowledges that this approach will put Americans in greater danger, both from insurgents and from Iraqi police whose loyalties are suspect.
The prediction of higher U.S. casualties is already coming true, as al-Qaeda-connected terrorists and Iraqi insurgents adjust their tactics to kill the vulnerable Americans. On April 23, two suicide truck bombers rammed a U.S. Army outpost near Baqubah, exploding two bombs that killed nine American soldiers and wounded 20 others.
As Iraq’s temperatures begin to soar into the 100s, the American troops will have to fight the heat as well as the insurgents. The secure base camps were well equipped with air conditioning, water and other supplies that won’t be as accessible in the remote outposts scattered throughout hostile neighborhoods.
Supplying these American troops will be another invitation for ambushes and roadside bombs.
The chances that U.S. troops will kill Iraqi civilians will rise, too, as may have happened earlier this month when an American helicopter gunship killed an Iraqi mother and her two sons in Baghdad Al-Amel neighborhood. [Christian Science Monitor, April 24, 2007]
Bush’s insistence on an open-ended U.S. occupation also plays into the hands of foreign al-Qaeda terrorists who are estimated to number only about five percent of the armed opposition.
Captured al-Qaeda documents reveal that the terrorist group has had trouble building alliances with Iraqi insurgents. So, al-Qaeda has pinned its hopes on keeping the U.S. military bogged down in Iraq indefinitely while those bridges are built and a new generation of extremists is recruited, trained and hardened.
In addition, having the U.S. military focused on Iraq protects Osama bin Laden and other terrorist leaders holed up on the Afghan-Pakistani border.
An announced date for American withdrawal would put non-Iraqi al-Qaeda operatives in a tighter fix. Without the indefinite U.S. occupation, al-Qaeda would find it tougher to recruit young jihadists and would likely face military pressure from Iraqi nationalists fed up with foreign interference of all kinds.
That is why al-Qaeda leaders view Bush’s open-ended war in Iraq as crucial to their long-range plans for spreading their radical ideology throughout the Muslim world. As “Atiyah,” one of bin Laden’s top lieutenants, explained in a Dec. 11, 2005, letter, “prolonging the war is in our interest.”
[To read the “prolonging the war” passage from the captured Atiyah letter at the Web site of West Point’s Combating Terrorism Center, click here and then scroll down to the bottom of page 16 and the top of page 17.]
‘False Hope’
Military and intelligence analysts have told me that the “surge” is already recognized as a failure by U.S. military officers stationed in Iraq. “It’s just another layer on top of what they’ve already been doing,” one well-placed U.S. military source said.
In this view, the “surge” is more a political tactic than a military one, a way for Bush to argue for more money without strings, one more time. Presumably, after the “surge” collapses in obvious failure, Bush and his advisers will point to another mirage on the horizon.
Or, as comedian Lewis Black has put it, “Keep false hope alive.”
Given what the Iraq Study Group has called the “grave and deteriorating” conditions in Iraq, why not give a timetable for American withdrawal a chance? It potentially could help achieve three goals:
First, it might tamp down the violence from Iraqi nationalists who, if Bush’s “logic” is right, would lie low for a while. Second, it might pressure the Iraqi government to get serious about reconciliation during a respite from the violence. Third, it might help isolate al-Qaeda and deny the terrorist group the recruiting advantage from the open-ended U.S. occupation.
There also would be an incentive for the Iraqi nationalists to cooperate in reconciliation, because the United States could reverse its withdrawal plans if Iraq descended into chaos as a failed state or became a haven for al-Qaeda. At minimum, an announced U.S. withdrawal would change the current depressing political and military dynamic in Iraq.
So, a Bush victory in the funding showdown with congressional Democrats might lead to some high-fiving at the White House and mean that President Bush will have saved some political face. But the prospect of an open-ended war will condemn Iraqis and American soldiers alike to nightmarish months ahead and the certainty of many more deaths.
In effect, they will be asked to die for W.
 

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Training the Iraqi Army and the Order of Battle

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Iraq's regional training facilities. Click map to view.
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Facts do not support the claim that the U.S. military has abandoned the training of the Iraqi Security Forces
In the conventional template of reporting on Iraq, glossy, controversial headlines often fail to reflect the reality of the situation on the ground. Take the latest reporting by McClatchy Newspapers' Nancy A. Youssef concerning the purported shift of U.S. military power away from training Iraqi Security Forces and back toward stability operations. The Detroit Free Press titles the article "U.S. plan backs off training of Iraqis," with a subtitle of "Policy shift entrusts security to American troop buildup." The Kansas City Star leads with "In a reversal, U.S. reliance on Iraqi army is fading," and subtitles with "Training troops is no longer a priority, changing the role of American forces." Forget the fact that Youssef provides no evidence within the article to back up such bold assertions. She relies on vague or nonexistent quotes from unnamed Pentagon and Washington officials, as well as Defense Secretary Robert Gates' failure to mention training last Thursday, to support her unfounded claim. In fact, many of the named officials in her article refute her assertion.

The fact is that the U.S. and Iraqi government continue to push the training of additional Iraqi combat and support troops, and are funding a dramatic growth in the capabilities in the Iraqi Security Forces. The Congress' failure to pass the Fiscal Year 2007 (FY07) Supplemental Budget is the only thing holding up the growth and training of the Iraqi military. In the FY07 budget, Congress has inserted the demand for a date for withdrawal of U.S. troops from Iraq, a demand which has prompted President Bush to insist he will veto the legislation.
The decrease in the training of the Iraqi Security Forces Youssef is detecting is the first effect of delaying the FY07 supplemental budget. The money to train the Iraqi units has dried up. While about 75 percent of the expansion of the Iraqi Security Forces is funded by the Iraqi government, this money is focused on equipping and training new combat units, including upgrading units to armored and mechanized divisions. The funds to train and equip over 33,000 Iraqi Army logistics, sustainment, maintenance, and support personnel comes from the U.S. FY07 supplemental budget.
Currently, the Iraqi Army has about 13,000 support personnel to sustain a 138,000 man force. The expansion of support personnel by 33,000 troops by the end of 2007 would provide the bare minimum support necessary for independent operations. The money to train the support units cannot be legally reappropriated from U.S. budgets to fund a foreign military equipment/training program, so the programs has stopped. This weakness in current Iraqi Security Forces structure is the focus of U.S. training in the "Year of Logistics."
It is highly unusual for U.S. generals to weigh in on disputes between the executive and legislative branches. The cut in funding for the training programming has caused U.S. generals to mention the situation no less than four times since the delay in the FY07 Supplemental Budget became a critical issue. "At the current moment, because of this lack of funding, MNSTC-I is unable to continue at the pace they were in the developmental process of the Iraqi security forces," Major General William Caldwell said in a recent press briefing. "It is starting to have some impact today, and will only have more of an impact over time."
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The recently established Besmaya range outside of Baghdad. Click map to view.
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Youssef's article also fails to note some very real and significant changes which are occurring with the structure and development of the Iraqi Army. The Army is expanding from 10 to 12 divisions. The current Iraqi Army has nine light infantry divisions and one mechanized division. This will expand to 12 divisions, with one armored division and two additional mechanized divisions, which will significantly increase the Army's mobility and striking power. To augment these new heavy divisions and to accelerate the motorization of the light infantry divisions, the Iraqi government is in the process of purchasing somewhere between 600 to 800 U.S. made M60 tanks and over 4,000 assorted armored personnel carriers.
In order to man these divisions, the Iraqi Army is using existing units as incubators. The 4th Iraqi Army Division is creating a 4th Brigade and the 7th Division is creating a 4th Brigade as well, both will help form the nucleus of a new Iraqi division. Over 6,000 recruits are being raised in the Kirkuk region--they will likely form the nucleus of the 11th Division, and another 5,000 troops are being raised in Basra.
Unfortunately, the expansion of the Iraqi Army by two divisions will force the service to poach trained cadres from existing units. This will result in a short term decrease in combat effectiveness for the cannibalized units, causing some to fall from an "in the lead" status to a lower level that requires Coalition partnering until they can increase their skill sets. When this happens, it will undoubtedly will be used to show the Iraqi Army is failing in its mission to take over security.
The U.S. military and Iraqi Ministry of Defense continue to raise troops and are in the process of an intensive training Program. Brigadier General Terry Wolff, the commander of the Military Assistant Training Team, highlighted this in a briefing in early March. "And you asked about replenishing the forces that were here as part of Baghdad security. Well, many of the young soldiers are going through basic training right now, and there are about 7,000 that are in basic training... Additionally, there are three training battalions in this force, and the training battalions are putting and are preparing soldiers for those units I described in the prime minister's initiative... So all total, about 15,000 soldiers training. You know, we've been as low as 6,000 at different cycles, based on whether we've got basic training running heavily or not, up to 15,000 is the highest I've seen.
The training isn't stopping with the foot soldiers, mechanized troops and supply and logistics soldiers. Multinational Forces Iraq established the 370th Air Expeditionary Advisory Group and Squadron at the New Al Muthana Air Base on April 22. The 370th Air Expeditionary Advisory Group is training the nucleus of the nascent Iraqi Air Force. And an Iraqi Military Intelligence Academy has recently been established to "prepare Iraqi security force graduates for counter-insurgency tactical and urban military intelligence operations."
Unlike what some would claim, training for the Iraqi Security Forces could only be higher if the FY07 supplemental budget submitted in February was not delayed for political reasons. The proponents of this delay claim that they want to bring the troops home sooner but, the delay in standing up their replacements (the Iraqi Security Forces) caused by Congress' actions has had the opposite effect of delaying the eventual reductions and the withdrawal of U.S. forces.
To put it bluntly, the facts do not support Nancy Youssef's highly provocative and patently false claim that the U.S. military has abandoned the training of the Iraqi Security Forces in order to fight al Qaeda and the insurgency. We've established the Iraqi Security Forces Order of Battle to document the progress and setbacks in the development of the Iraqi Army, police and other services, and there are no indications the training has been curtailed, other than what is being restricted by the U.S. Congress' failure to pass the supplemental funding bill. Youssef should do her homework before making such provocative and inaccurate statements
 

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The problem, I believe, hasn't been 'training" Iraqis to fight but getting them to fight the way we want them to and not either turn and run, or worse, turn on American troops.
This comes from a lack of vision from the onset. Iraq's will never fight for an idea that originates with an American president. They must be allowed to find their own purpose, access their own inner patriotism. If that leads to an alliance with the Iranians, guess what, their were many voices telling the administration this would likely be the outcome.
Unfortunately the only voices Dumbya listens to are disembodied.
 

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