Managers miss on platoon advantage
There's a reason dominant setup men often struggle as closers; managers, take note
Ben Jedlovec
Baseball Info Solutions
ESPN Insider
Bobby Jenks was the closer for the White Sox since late in their 2005 World Series championship season through 2009 -- and on and off last season -- though it wasn't an entirely smooth ride. Once able to hit 100 mph on the radar gun regularly, Jenks' average fastball velocity dipped into the low 90s in 2007 and 2008 before rebounding back to 95 mph in 2010. He also clashed with skipper Ozzie Guillen on multiple occasions, though Jenks always managed to keep his closer role.
Matt Thornton was even more dominant than Jenks the past few seasons. An under-the-radar pickup from Seattle before the 2006 season, Thornton worked with pitching coach Don Cooper and improved his control substantially after his initial time in Chicago. When general manager Kenny Williams declined to re-sign Jenks last offseason, the GM felt confident that lefty Thornton was ready to assume the closer role after striking out 81 batters in just 60 2/3 innings as the setup man last year.
However, the transition did not go as well as anticipated. Thornton blew his first four save opportunities in 2011, and Guillen was forced to pull the lefty from his new role by the end of April. While the White Sox's poor defense was partly to blame, Thornton's underlying rates weren't encouraging, either. He was walking more batters and striking out fewer, a dangerous sign for a pitcher.
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The Specialist Basis
On-base plus slugging by pitcher and batter hand, MLB 2011:
<TABLE><THEAD><TR><TH></TH><TH>RH pitcher</TH><TH>LH pitcher</TH></TR></THEAD><TBODY><TR class=last><TD>RH hitter</TD><TD>0.677</TD><TD>0.738</TD></TR><TR class=last><TD>LH hitter</TD><TD>0.742</TD><TD>0.643</TD></TR></TBODY></TABLE>
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Did Thornton simply not have the mental strength to handle the intensity of the closer's role?
<OFFER>
While it's difficult to prove an idea based on one case study, let's take a closer look at Thornton's transition to the closer's role. Last season, Guillen liked to bring Thornton in to face the left-handed part of the opposing lineup late in the game. We know the trends: lefty hitters strike out more, walk less and hit for less power against left-handed pitchers. Righty hitters also fare worse against their same-handed counterparts.
The difference is obviously substantial enough that managers like to exploit these tendencies whenever they can. With a right-handed pitcher scheduled to start, the opposing manager will work as many lefty hitters into the lineup as he can. Later in the game, the pitching team takes back the tactical advantage, as its manager can mix and match relievers to his benefit while the opposing batting order is less flexible. Again, common baseball conventions.
As a result, Thornton and other middle relievers generally have the platoon advantage a sizeable portion of the time. While left-handed starters have faced lefty hitters just 24 percent of the time this year, left-handed relievers have had the platoon advantage nearly twice as often, against 44 percent of batters faced.
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The Platoon Advantage
Pitching with the platoon advantage,
MLB 2011:
<TABLE><THEAD><TR><TH></TH><TH>Starter</TH><TH>Reliever</TH><TH>Closer</TH></TR></THEAD><TBODY><TR class=last><TD>RHP</TD><TD>49%</TD><TD>56%</TD><TD>50%</TD></TR><TR class=last><TD>LHP</TD><TD>24%</TD><TD>44%</TD><TD>30%</TD></TR></TBODY></TABLE>
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However, due to the rigid nature of their role, closers don't get the same platoon advantage as other relievers. When it comes to closers, most managers opt to ignore platoon advantages and insert the closer for the full ninth inning, regardless of the opposing hitters due up. As a result, closers have the platoon advantage less often than middle relievers and about as often as starters.
When installed as the closer this year, Matt Thornton started facing more right-handed hitters than he had in his previous five years with the White Sox. From 2006 to 2010, he had the platoon advantage 41 percent of the time, including 44 percent last season. However, the lefty has had the platoon advantage against only 36 percent of batters this year despite spending only one month in the closer's role. Just look at the rate he had the platoon advantage in previous years:
2006: 37%
2007: 42%
2008: 47%
2009: 37%
2010: 44%
2011: 36%
Since 2006, left-handed closers have held the platoon advantage against just 27 percent of batters, compared to 42 percent for lefty middle relievers. It's no wonder few left-handed relievers stick in the typical closer's role. A case in point: Brian Fuentes is the only left-handed reliever to rank in the top 30 in saves this year.
This fact is less a warning against left-handed closers than an indictment of contemporary closer usage. If managers strategized in the ninth inning as they do in the seventh and eighth, their relievers would have the platoon advantage more often and likely would be more effective as a unit.
With a two-run lead in the top of the ninth of Game 4 in the 2009 NL Division Series against the Phillies, Colorado manager Jim Tracy brought in closer Huston Street to face the top of the Phillies lineup in a standard save situation. Street, a righty, faced three left-handed hitters (including Chase Utley and Ryan Howard, who drove in the tying runs) and two switch-hitters before surrendering the lead on a Jayson Werth single. Tracy then brought in lefty Joe Beimel to face intimidating pinch-hitter Miguel Cairo (a righty), who grounded out to end the inning. Out of the seven batters who came to the plate in the half-inning, the Rockies had the platoon advantage exactly once.
Phillies manager Charlie Manuel must have been paying attention. With a one-run lead in the bottom half of the inning, a clear save situation, Manuel brought in lefty Scott Eyre rather than righty closer Brad Lidge to face the top of the Rockies' order. Despite two switch-hitters mixed in, Eyre stayed in the game to match up against lefty hitters Carlos Gonzalez and Todd Helton. After getting two outs (but allowing two baserunners), Manuel went to Lidge, who struck out Troy Tulowitzki to end the game and the series. Manuel played the platoon matchups rather than adhering to strict closer usage, and it gave his team a better chance to win the game.
Besides Thornton, other relievers have also been affected by role changes and the corresponding platoon differences. Indians closer Chris Perez and Sergio Santos (Thornton's replacement as Chicago's closer) have had the platoon advantage at least 10 percent less often than in 2010, both bigger drop-offs than Thornton's. Additionally, Phil Coke enjoyed the platoon advantage 44 percent of the time last season as a Tigers middle reliever but just 33 percent this year as a starter.
Going the other direction, Kerry Wood spent half of last season as a closer but is now a setup reliever for the Cubs. He has also had the platoon advantage 64 percent of the time this year, compared to 49 percent last year.
According to the NY Daily News, Mets closer Francisco Rodriguez would be willing to pitch as a setup man if the Mets wanted to trade him to a contender before the trading deadline. Despite fewer save opportunities, this actually might boost his underlying numbers and strengthen his free-agent résumé.
K-Rod has had the platoon advantage against just 40 percent of hitters this season, a very low rate for a right-hander. If traded to the Yankees or another contender with an established closer, K-Rod could be strategically used against the toughest right-handed hitters and could be more dominant than he has been as the Mets' closer.
There's a reason dominant setup men often struggle as closers; managers, take note
Ben Jedlovec
Baseball Info Solutions
ESPN Insider
Bobby Jenks was the closer for the White Sox since late in their 2005 World Series championship season through 2009 -- and on and off last season -- though it wasn't an entirely smooth ride. Once able to hit 100 mph on the radar gun regularly, Jenks' average fastball velocity dipped into the low 90s in 2007 and 2008 before rebounding back to 95 mph in 2010. He also clashed with skipper Ozzie Guillen on multiple occasions, though Jenks always managed to keep his closer role.
Matt Thornton was even more dominant than Jenks the past few seasons. An under-the-radar pickup from Seattle before the 2006 season, Thornton worked with pitching coach Don Cooper and improved his control substantially after his initial time in Chicago. When general manager Kenny Williams declined to re-sign Jenks last offseason, the GM felt confident that lefty Thornton was ready to assume the closer role after striking out 81 batters in just 60 2/3 innings as the setup man last year.
However, the transition did not go as well as anticipated. Thornton blew his first four save opportunities in 2011, and Guillen was forced to pull the lefty from his new role by the end of April. While the White Sox's poor defense was partly to blame, Thornton's underlying rates weren't encouraging, either. He was walking more batters and striking out fewer, a dangerous sign for a pitcher.
<!-- begin inline 1 -->
The Specialist Basis
On-base plus slugging by pitcher and batter hand, MLB 2011:
<TABLE><THEAD><TR><TH></TH><TH>RH pitcher</TH><TH>LH pitcher</TH></TR></THEAD><TBODY><TR class=last><TD>RH hitter</TD><TD>0.677</TD><TD>0.738</TD></TR><TR class=last><TD>LH hitter</TD><TD>0.742</TD><TD>0.643</TD></TR></TBODY></TABLE>
<!-- end inline 1 -->
Did Thornton simply not have the mental strength to handle the intensity of the closer's role?
<OFFER>
While it's difficult to prove an idea based on one case study, let's take a closer look at Thornton's transition to the closer's role. Last season, Guillen liked to bring Thornton in to face the left-handed part of the opposing lineup late in the game. We know the trends: lefty hitters strike out more, walk less and hit for less power against left-handed pitchers. Righty hitters also fare worse against their same-handed counterparts.
The difference is obviously substantial enough that managers like to exploit these tendencies whenever they can. With a right-handed pitcher scheduled to start, the opposing manager will work as many lefty hitters into the lineup as he can. Later in the game, the pitching team takes back the tactical advantage, as its manager can mix and match relievers to his benefit while the opposing batting order is less flexible. Again, common baseball conventions.
As a result, Thornton and other middle relievers generally have the platoon advantage a sizeable portion of the time. While left-handed starters have faced lefty hitters just 24 percent of the time this year, left-handed relievers have had the platoon advantage nearly twice as often, against 44 percent of batters faced.
<!-- begin inline 2 -->
The Platoon Advantage
Pitching with the platoon advantage,
MLB 2011:
<TABLE><THEAD><TR><TH></TH><TH>Starter</TH><TH>Reliever</TH><TH>Closer</TH></TR></THEAD><TBODY><TR class=last><TD>RHP</TD><TD>49%</TD><TD>56%</TD><TD>50%</TD></TR><TR class=last><TD>LHP</TD><TD>24%</TD><TD>44%</TD><TD>30%</TD></TR></TBODY></TABLE>
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However, due to the rigid nature of their role, closers don't get the same platoon advantage as other relievers. When it comes to closers, most managers opt to ignore platoon advantages and insert the closer for the full ninth inning, regardless of the opposing hitters due up. As a result, closers have the platoon advantage less often than middle relievers and about as often as starters.
When installed as the closer this year, Matt Thornton started facing more right-handed hitters than he had in his previous five years with the White Sox. From 2006 to 2010, he had the platoon advantage 41 percent of the time, including 44 percent last season. However, the lefty has had the platoon advantage against only 36 percent of batters this year despite spending only one month in the closer's role. Just look at the rate he had the platoon advantage in previous years:
2006: 37%
2007: 42%
2008: 47%
2009: 37%
2010: 44%
2011: 36%
Since 2006, left-handed closers have held the platoon advantage against just 27 percent of batters, compared to 42 percent for lefty middle relievers. It's no wonder few left-handed relievers stick in the typical closer's role. A case in point: Brian Fuentes is the only left-handed reliever to rank in the top 30 in saves this year.
This fact is less a warning against left-handed closers than an indictment of contemporary closer usage. If managers strategized in the ninth inning as they do in the seventh and eighth, their relievers would have the platoon advantage more often and likely would be more effective as a unit.
With a two-run lead in the top of the ninth of Game 4 in the 2009 NL Division Series against the Phillies, Colorado manager Jim Tracy brought in closer Huston Street to face the top of the Phillies lineup in a standard save situation. Street, a righty, faced three left-handed hitters (including Chase Utley and Ryan Howard, who drove in the tying runs) and two switch-hitters before surrendering the lead on a Jayson Werth single. Tracy then brought in lefty Joe Beimel to face intimidating pinch-hitter Miguel Cairo (a righty), who grounded out to end the inning. Out of the seven batters who came to the plate in the half-inning, the Rockies had the platoon advantage exactly once.
Phillies manager Charlie Manuel must have been paying attention. With a one-run lead in the bottom half of the inning, a clear save situation, Manuel brought in lefty Scott Eyre rather than righty closer Brad Lidge to face the top of the Rockies' order. Despite two switch-hitters mixed in, Eyre stayed in the game to match up against lefty hitters Carlos Gonzalez and Todd Helton. After getting two outs (but allowing two baserunners), Manuel went to Lidge, who struck out Troy Tulowitzki to end the game and the series. Manuel played the platoon matchups rather than adhering to strict closer usage, and it gave his team a better chance to win the game.
Besides Thornton, other relievers have also been affected by role changes and the corresponding platoon differences. Indians closer Chris Perez and Sergio Santos (Thornton's replacement as Chicago's closer) have had the platoon advantage at least 10 percent less often than in 2010, both bigger drop-offs than Thornton's. Additionally, Phil Coke enjoyed the platoon advantage 44 percent of the time last season as a Tigers middle reliever but just 33 percent this year as a starter.
Going the other direction, Kerry Wood spent half of last season as a closer but is now a setup reliever for the Cubs. He has also had the platoon advantage 64 percent of the time this year, compared to 49 percent last year.
According to the NY Daily News, Mets closer Francisco Rodriguez would be willing to pitch as a setup man if the Mets wanted to trade him to a contender before the trading deadline. Despite fewer save opportunities, this actually might boost his underlying numbers and strengthen his free-agent résumé.
K-Rod has had the platoon advantage against just 40 percent of hitters this season, a very low rate for a right-hander. If traded to the Yankees or another contender with an established closer, K-Rod could be strategically used against the toughest right-handed hitters and could be more dominant than he has been as the Mets' closer.
